Approved For Release 2002 P9/05: 20-R) 17 T00975A005300040001-8 25X1 5 September 1960 Copy No. C CENTRAI INTELLIGEN BULLETIN



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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iran: The combination of Soviet advances to Tehran and the Shah's continuing dissatisfaction with the extent of American aid and support, especially in the military field, is posing a threat to the United States position in Iran, according to Ambassador Wailes. The ambassador fears that the Shah, in an effort to regain lost prestige, has "opened doors which may be difficult to close" and which can lead to a weakening of Iran's internal stability. Meanwhile, the new, nonpartisan cabinet of Prime Minister Sharif Emami "certainly seems no better than the last."

the last."

Laos: General Phoumi is bitter over the course of events in Laos and appears to be considering military action of some kind against the newly invested Souvanna Phouma government. Phoumi made threats at his head-quarters in Savannakhet on 2 September to divide Laos in two. According to Phoumi, his compromise settlement with Souvanna Phouma was only to gain time, and if he returned to Vientiane, he would have no choice but to "uphold Souvanna Phouma's policy of making Laos red."

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\*The clandestine Pathet Lao radio, meanwhile, has responded to Souvanna Phouma's proposal to negotiate, stating that although the Pathet Lao movement welcomes this proposal, it demands the

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	immediate removal of the "Phoumi clique" from the govern- ment and an immediate half to the civil war.
	III. THE WEST
	Venezuela-Cuba:
	Fabricio Ojeda, a leftist Vene-
	zuclan political leader who has spent considerable time in
	Cuba since late 1959, is clanning a coup attempt in Venezuela
	with the support of Cubia officials. The move may be timed to
	exploit the current pro-Castro agitation in Venezuela following
	the recent OAS foreign ministers' meeting. Venezuela has more
	private US investment than any other Latin American country,
	and is currently a target of Castro's anti-US revolutionary pro-
	gram in the area.
	Dominican Republic: General "Ramfis" Trujillo, the Do-
:	minican dictator's son who is now in Europe, has almost cer-
	tainly established confects with the Soviet bloc. Anti-US, pro-
	Cuban, and pro-Soviet tirades are being continued in the government-controlled Dominican press and radiobroadcasts.
	An extensive propaganda campaign has been preparing the pub-
	lic for the dictator's resumption of the Presidency. The US
	Consulate in Ciudad Trujillo fears the Dominican leader will
	kill many dissidents who belong to a coalition led by pro-US
	moderates.
	moderates.
	*El Salvador: Unless President Lemus takes forceful meas-
	ures against an antigovernment demonstration scheduled for 5
	September, the army may intervene and replace him with a man
	of its own choosing. Antigovernment agitation, led by Pro-Com-

September, the army may intervene and replace him with a man of its own choosing. Antigovernment agitation, led by Pro-Communist and pro-Castro students and labor elements has been increasing in frequency and violence since early last month. The National Civil Orientation Front, a loosely knit organization composed of opposition groups—most are Communist-controlled—reportedly is planning to coordinate actions with the student protest movement. However, some non-Communist elements, including a group led by ex-President Osorio, may be attempting

to use the student agitation to regain power.

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DAILY BRIEF

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## THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director. National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

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The Director

**Atomic Energy Commission** 

The Chairman

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The Director

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